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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BIL\ SHEU ~IOTOR AND FI-
X AXCE CO~IPANY, IXC., a Ctah 
eorporation, Plai11tiff and Respondent, 
YS. 
GEORGE ANDERSON, SELECT 
C~\HS. IXC., a Utah corporation, awl 
T<>XY CHAPMAN, 
Defendants and A]Jpcllwds. 
Case No. 
10821 
Plaintiff's and Respondent's Brief 
INTRODCCTORY COl\Il\IENTS 
Respondent is in accord with the Statement of the 
Kirnl of Case and Statement of Facts, with the excep-
tion of the following particulars: 
In the Statement of the Kind of Case, Appellant 
indicates that the action is brought by the plaintiff cor-
poration against George Anderson, the president of 
Select Cars, Inc., which is incorrect. The action is 
1 
brought against George Anderson, an indiYitlua] 
I 
against Select Cars, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Tony 
Chapman. The remaining statement is accurate. 
Within the Statement of Facts, the Appellant 
alleges the purpose of an affidavit which has been in-
troduced in evidence as Exhibit 1-P was merely to set 
forth a specimen signature which was authorized by 
the Appellant Anderson. 'fhe purpose of said docu-
ment, as set forth in the testimony, was primarily for 
the establishment of personal liability for all obliga-
tions incurred by George Anderson or Tony Chapman 
or Select Cars, Inc., in connection with the aforesaid 
parties operating as Select Cars, Inc. 
The transcript of proceedings on Page 62, lines 
24 through 27; Page 63, lines 11 through 13; on an 
unnumbered page between pages 66 and 67 at lines 
23-27 ;and on page 68, lines 9-10, all set forth in testi-
mony the purpose of Exhibit 1-P was to establish 
personal liability on the part of George Anderson for 
all extensions of credit to Select Cars, Inc. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
(a) STATEMENT OF LA\V RELATIVE 
TO INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 
AND EVIDENCE INDICATING PARTIES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR DRAFTING OF PRIME 
DOCUMENT. 
2 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement 
of the law set forth on page 8 of Appellants' Brief, 
a[J(l eites the following case in harmony with said propo-
sition: Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing Co., 233 
P. 2d 355, which states: (1~clJ.?..ii1) 
"Doubtful ambiguous terms and contract 
should be interpreted ar;ainst the party who has 
chosen the terms." (Emphasis added). 
This rule of law is further cited in Huber and 
Howland Construction Company vs. City of South Salt 
Lake, 7 Vtah 2d 273, 32::3 P. 2d 258, and in Seal vs. 
Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d 503. 
The rule of law not being in dispute between the 
parties, the Respondent refers to the transcript of 
proceedings on page fi2, line 30, wherein the president 
of the Plaintiff-Respondent corporation stated: 
"_Mr. Anderson (Appellant) and I together 
wrote up the agreement you mentioned." (Agree-
ment refers to Exhibit 1-P.) 
On page 68, lines 11 through 16, witness Myron 
Horne testified that he was present during the discus-
sion between the parties and indicated a joint effort 
resulted in the preparation of the document shown as 
Exhibit 1-P. The Defend_flnt-Appellant, George An-
derson, stated under cross-examination (page 88, lines 
17 through 20) that the document noted as Exhibit 
1-P was discussed "back and forth" between the par-
ties, showing that in fact said document was prepared 
by both the Appellant and the Respondent. Under 
3 
the above mentioned rule of interpretation, it would 
seem that, at the very least, the document should not 
be interpreted against the Respondent. 
Exhibit 6-D shows a draft copy of Exhibit 1-P, 
and the Appellant states relative to said exhibit at 
page 83, line 12 of the transcript, that certain termi-
nology written on said draft, Exhibit 6-D, in ink, was 
made by him specifically. Said terminology is as follows: 
" . . .and both of us shall be bound by the sig-
nature of either of us." (Referring to himself and 
Tony Chapman). 
Under the rules of interpretation as above cited, 
it would appear that such terminology would have to 
be interpreted most harshly against the Appellant, 
although in any event there is little question as to the 
assumption of personal liability as indicated by said 
statement. 
It should be further noted that Exhibit 1-P as set 
forth by the Appellant in his brief does not fairly set 
forth the facts as indicated in said Exhibit, the differ-
ence being that the document as typed, both in draft 
(Exhibit 6-D) and in its final form (Exhibit 1-P) , 
shows a signature line only for George Anderson, 
with no title or any indication of signature by Select 
Cars, Inc. The words "Select Cars, Inc.," are in hand-
writing above the name of George Anderson, with 
George Anderson's signature with the designation 
"Pres" following his name, all in Mr. Anderson's own 
4 
handwriting. There can be 110 doubt of both parties 
participating in the drafting of Exhibit 1-P. 
(b) STATE~IENT OF LA,¥ RELATIVE 
TO AMBIGUITY ESTABLISHING PERSON-
AL LIAlHLITY ON THE PART OF DEFEND-
ANT - APPELLANT 'VHETHER INTER-
PRETED 'VITHIN THE .FOUR CORNERS 
OF THE DOCUMENT IF NOT AMBIGUOUS, 
AXD THE ALLO"r ANCE OF P AROL EVI-
DEXCE IF Al\IBIGUOUS. 
Respondent acknowledges the cases set forth in 
Appellant's Point I, and agrees with the general rule 
of law set forth therein to the effect that a document 
should, wherever possible, be interpreted within the 
four corners of the document, said rule being more 
fully set forth in the case of Mathis vs .. Madsen, 1 U. 2d 
46, 261 P.2d 952. 
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule 
is to determine what the parties intended by what 
they said. The Court may not add, ignore or 
discard words in the process but attempt to 
render certain the meaning of the provision in 
dispute by an objective and reasonable construc-
tion of the whole contract." 
In the case of 'Villiam R. Clyde vs. Eddington 
Canning Company and ,V. R. Eddington, 10 Utah 2d 
H, 347 P.2d 563, a letter of guarantee was written which 
stated within the body: 
5 
"This is to certify that I, personally, will 
guarantee you payment for any tomatoes you 
raise and deliver for us, or any other crop con-
tracted for, on the day contract specifies for pay. 
ment. 
"Very truly yours, 
"Eddington Canning Company 
"Isl ''T· R. Eddington 
"'V. R. Eddington" 
The Defendant in this case contended that by 
signing the letter in the form indica~fd it was not his 
intention to be bound personally, which he also averred 
to in an affidavit. The Court, however, was not per-
suaded, inasmuch as it appeared the clear language 
of the writing did not impress such contention. 'Vhere-
fore, it would appear in the present matter there was 
no question as to intent within the body of the letter 
in creating personal liability on the Appellant, and 
should an ambiguity arise, it was by virtue of the 
manner in which the signature was affixed. In the 
event the Court should determine that Exhibit 1-P 
is, in fact, ambiguous, then the cases are clear that 
extrinsic and parol evidence may be used to determine 
the intent of the parties. See Milford State Bank vs. 
'Vest Field Canal and Irigation Company, et al., 
Blackner vs. 'Vest Field Canal and Irrigation Com-
pany, 108 U. 528, 162 P.2d 101. 
"Ordinarily the intention of the parties to a 
written contract must be determined by an ex-
amination of the writing, but if a phrase or a 
part of a written agreement is ambiguous and 
the intention of the parties cannot be determined 
6 
from the writing itself, parol evidence is admis-
sible to show the intention of the parties." 
The Appellant relies upon the issues as set forth 
in the pre-trial order without any objection, but now 
contends said issues are improper. Said pre-trial order 
established a necessity of testimony to clear the ambi-
guity set forth in Exhibit 1-P. 
POINT II. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE ALLOWED 
\YITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE 
\iVHERE THEY ARE NOT AT ISSUE. 
Appellant relies upon Title 78-37-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, for his rejection of allowance of 
attorney's fees, which the Respondent deems inappro-
priately cited as said provision relates to attorneys' 
fees in foreclosure actions, which is not the case in point. 
It is conceded, however, that no evidence was intro-
duced relative to an award of attorneys' fees, which 
under Utah law is required in the event said fees are 
at issue. This is the general rule of law as set forth 
in the case of F.M.A. Financial Corporation, a corpora-
tion, vs. Build, Inc., a corporation, et al., 17 Utah 
2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670, which states where attorneys' 
fees are an issue of fact, it is necessary part of the 
plaintiff's case, which he has the burden of proving. 
\Vhere attorneys' fees are not at issue, however, the 
above referenced case states: 
7 
. "Because both judges and la":yers have spe. 
cial knowledge as to the value of legal services. 
this is not always required to be proved by sworn 
testimony. It is sometimes submitted upon stipu. 
lation: as to amount; or that the Judge may fix 
it on the basis of his own knowledge and experi-
ence; and/or in connection with reference to a 
Bar approved schedule. Any one of these would 
have provided an evidenciary basis for making 
the determination." 
Inasmuch as there is no issue of fact as to attorney's 
fees, the Appellant having failed to bring said fees into 
issue in his Second Amended Complaint, and relying 
upon the issues as set forth in the pre-trial order, 
which does not put at issue said attorneys' fees, Re-
spondent contends that the determination of attorneys' 
fees in a matter strictly within the province of the trial 
court, and no additional evidence to establish the same 
is required. 
Respondent further contends that, pursuant to 
Rule 8 ( d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required other than those to the 
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied 
in the responsive pleading." 
The Appellant in his Second Amended Answer 
in this matter, which is the controlling answer in the 
present case, raises no issue as to attorneys' fees. There 
is a general reliance upon the issues as established 
by the pre-trial order by the Appellant. However, here 
again no issue was raised as to attorney's fees. A re-
sponsive pleading was required pursuant to the above 
8 
cited rule. There being none made, a reasonable attor-
neys' fee is admitted and should be allowed as set .forth 
in the ~~.1\1.C. Financial Corporation case, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent submits that the decision of the 
trial court holding that the agreement between the 
parties hereto was ambiguous and thereby requiring 
extrinsic and parol evidence to determine the intention 
of the parties was correct, and that the evidence sub-
mitted by parol proved clearly and convincingly the 
intent of the parties, and in fact created a personal 
liability on the part of the Appellant. In any event, 
the intent of the parties as shown within the four 
corners of the document was such as to require a finding 
of personal liability on the part of the Appellant. At-
torneys' fees as provided in the order of the Court were 
proper and correct inasmuch as the matter of attorneys' 
fees was not put at issue by the answer of the Appellant 
nor by the pre-trial order and was raised for the first 
time on appeal, and can only be considered admitted by 
the failure of the Appellant to otherwise plead. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE B. WELLING of 
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND TAYLOR 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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